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Wine Economics

The Father of Wine Economics?

July 14, 2008 by by Michael Veseth (University of Puget Sound and The Wine Economist)

Adam Smith is generally regarded as the Father of Economics, even though many wrote on economic topics before him. Was he also the Father of Wine Economics? 

The case for Smith’s paternity is made in the most obvious (and least likely) of places, The Wealth of Nation (1776), his most famous work. It is the obvious source because Smith wrote about everything in Wealth of Nations: history, theory, policy, even provided practical advice. It is the least likely place to look, however, because it is so little read (really read, if you know what I mean) and because people only remember the book for two thing: the Invisible Hand and the Pin Factory example of the division of labor. But there is a lot more to be found, including an early treatise on wine economics.

Adam Smith wrote a good deal about wine. This was partly because he traveled in France and learned about wine markets first hand. But it was also a fact that Britain was for centuries a wine-drinking country, as John Nye’s fine book explains, just as it is so today, with a practical interest in wine market concerns.

The foundation of Smith’s wine economics is laid out early in Wealth of Nations, Book One, Chapter 11: Of the Rent of Land. Here Smith tries to explain why some kinds of land earn more than other lands. Land suitable for viticulture earns higher rent, Smith said, and has long done so.

That the vineyard, when properly planted and brought to perfection, was the most valuable part of the farm, seems to have been an undoubted maxim in the ancient agriculture as it is in the modern through all the wine countries

But viticultural profits were constantly threatened, Smith argued. Not by nature, although this could cause bad crops, and not by high taxes, although he argued against them. The chief threat (or perceived threat) to viticultural earnings was expansion to new lands. Old vineyards, as he called them, were threatened by New Vineyards — and would seek protection from them or to prevent their development. This section reads very well today if you change Old Vineyards to Old World wine and New Vineyards to New World Wine. Certainly New World Wines (and their vineyard, cellar and marketing practices) are seen by many Old World producers as a threat to their livelihood. Adam Smith understood why Old would seek by any means to prevent development of the New. You don’t have to have a Ph.D. in economics to already know that he did not approve.

Smith wrote about terroir, too. I can’t really say that Adam Smith invented terroir, the idea of a special taste of place that winemakers strive for, but I can say that he understood its economic value. Smith wrote that

The vine is more affected by the difference in soils than any other fruit tree. From some it derives a flavour which no culture or management can equal, it is supposed, upon any other. This flavour, real or imaginary, is sometimes peculiar to the produce of a few vineyards; sometimes it extends through the greater part of a small district and sometimes through a considerable part of a large province.

I note with interest that Smith recognized terroir and doubted the reality of its existence in the same sentence (”real or imagined”). It isn’t terroir that really matters to a wine economist, I suppose, it is only that people think there is terroir. Smith wrote at length about the economics of these special wines and, because of their limited quantities, the premium prices they could command. Any modern winemaker, upon reading this section, would immediately try to create an A.V.A. to cash in on the possibility of terroir by limiting supply.

The whole quantity of such wines that is brought to market falls short of the effectual demand, or the demand of those who would be willing to pay … The whole quantity, therefore, can be disposed of to those who are willing to pay more, which necessarily raises the price above that of common wine.

A small part of this higher price … is sufficient to pay the wages of the extraordinary wages bestowed upon their cultivation, and the profits of the extraordinary stock which puts this labor in motion.

Smith’s treatment of wine is not complete - there is no discussion of cork versus screw-cap, for example, and no treatment of en primeur wine futures, but what he does say shows pretty clearly how well he understood the political economy of wine.

So, to answer the question that started this entry, is Adam Smith the Father of Wine Economics? Probably not, is my answer. His analysis in Wealth of Nations is certainly very good, but I am pretty sure that earlier economists did not ignore the wine market. The reason: because wine was so very important to economy and society from the earliest days.

The Most Profitable Wine in the World

July 17, 2008 by by Michael Veseth (University of Puget Sound and The Wine Economist)

Following the Money to New Zealand

2128.jpgWhat’s the most profitable wine in the world? Not the most expensive single wine (like Chateau Pétrus or Screaming Eagle), but the most profitable type of wine? Guardian wine critic Tim Atkin raised this question is an article called “Bottle Banks” and it is interesting to think about what the answer might be.

Profits, of course, are all about the difference between price and cost. So which country gets the highest average price for its wine exports? Most people are surprised to learn that it is New Zealand (see footnote below). New Zealand is unusual among wine producing countries in that its exports are almost entirely premium and super premium wines. The domestic Kiwi market for low cost bulk wines is filled by imports from Australia and Chile, leaving NZ producers free to focus on higher value export markets. This nearly single-minded concentration on upmarket wines results in high average export prices.

New Zealand would therefore be a prime suspect for the most profitable wine-making country - if higher production costs don’t offset the price advantage.

Easy as 1-2-3?

I was not completely surprised, therefore, to read Atkin’s conclusion that the most profitable wine is probably Marlborough Sauvignon Blanc from New Zealand, which is by far that country’s leading wine export. Atkin writes that

I was sitting talking to the owner of a top New Zealand Sauvignon in Australia recently when he proudly took out his mobile phone and showed me pictures of his bespoke Maserati. ‘Kiwi Sauvignon is cheap and easy to make and commands a premium,’ he explained. ‘And by the time I have to pay my growers for their grapes, the wine is already on the market.

That certainly sounds easy enough. Atkin continues

He’s got a point. Marlborough Sauvignon generally produces heavy crops (partly a result of fertile soils, but also of vineyard practices). Once it’s in the winery, all the average producer has to do is crush the grapes, add yeast and ferment it at a cool temperature in stainless steel. A matter of days later the wine is ready for bottling.

Nothing could be simpler really, although I didn’t know you could make wine in just a few days. I wonder why everyone doesn’t just get up and go to Marlborough to make Sauvignon Blanc? Since economists are trained to be suspicious of easy money stories like this, I thought it would be interesting to talk to someone in the New Zealand industry about profitability.

Hidden Complexity

So I wrote to Neal Ibbotson, managing director of Saint Clair Family Estate Wines in Blenheim (Marlborough). I met Neal in 2004 when I was doing research for a book on globalization. Neal was a pioneer winegrower in the Marlborough region — Neal and Judy planted their first vineyard there in 1978 –  and someone whose knowledge and opinion I value a lot. The 2003 Saint Clair Wairau Reserve Sauvignon Blanc that I sampled on that visit was the most memorable NZ wine I have ever tasted.

Neal didn’t comment on the Guardian article directly, but what he had to say helped me understand the hidden complexity of the situation.

Marlborough Sauvignon Blanc can in fact be a pretty profitable wine, but that doesn’t mean that everyone is rolling in cash.

Neal writes that

It is very profitable for the best grape growers on the best soils where they can combine relatively high yields and high quality. Say 5% of Marlborough’s growers. These growers deservedly reap the benefit from having out laid the capital and taken some risk and are very fortunate that the grapes they grow are a unique product, in strong demand.

It is less profitable and is in some cases unprofitable, for those growers who are in more marginal areas on less productive soils where yields and often quality are not as good

It can also be quite profitable for the very best wine companies who produce a high quality product and have good access to the markets. Say 10%. There are however both Marlborough Sauvignon Blanc grape growers and wine companies that are unprofitable. {It’s worse in some other parts of NZ.}

There are also a number of cases of new labels that have been produced, by would-be winemakers, that are sitting in the bottling halls, or on retail shelves, gathering dust whilst interest accrues in their bank accounts. In addition there is the huge capital requirement to take a small producer, normally profit marginal, to a medium or large producer where profitability is more likely

This is clearly a more realistic picture of the NZ wine industry. There some firms that are very profitable due to cost advantages or because they are able to leverage unique assets, like reputation or special vineyard characteristics. But there are other firms that, lacking these advantages, scrape by or lose money. Distribution is the big bottleneck in the global wine business, and wineries with access to efficient distribution have a head start towards profit goals. Inevitably in any industry with heterogeneous inputs and outputs, the profit profile is complicated.

Not only are Marlborough profits not uniformly high, according to Neal, they are also not certain. High prices require high quality and the ability to maintain a reputation for exceptional wines (I will talk about what Saint Clair is doing in this regard in a future post). But there are other factors to be considered. Neal writes that …

Most wineries are struggling to some degree with the increasing cost of buying in Sauvignon Blanc grapes, and the high value of the NZ $ which increases the cost of NZ wine in the market place and makes any additional increase in price from the wineries extremely difficult. Because of increasing prices for Marlborough Sauvignon Blanc grapes and the high NZ$ at present most wineries are caught between a rock and a hard place

This reminds me of a discussion I had with Jane Hunter of Hunters Wines in 2004. (Hunters was one of the first NZ Sauvignon Blancs to break into the key British Market and establish the region’s reputation there). What is the biggest threat to your industry, I asked her. The appreciation of the NZ dollar, she replied without hesitation.

Tim Atkin might be right about Marlborough Sauvignon Blanc, but he’s also wrong. I think it must be a very profitable wine for some (I wonder … was he talking to someone from Cloudy Bay?), but making wine and then making money making wine isn’t as easy as he suggests, even in Marlborough.

(Footnote: Here is an interesting fact: Canada actually earns higher per liter revenues from its bottled wine exports than New Zealand, according to my copy of The Global Wine Statistical Compendium, but comparing it to New Zealand is like comparing apples and oranges. Or table wine to ice wine, to be more specific. Canada’s wine exports are tiny compared to New Zealand, but the per-bottle revenues are high because it is mainly expensive ice wine - sweet dessert wines made from grapes left on the vine so that freezing weather can concentrate the juice and flavor.)

AAWE Papers in Portland: Global Warming and Wine on the West Coast

July 10, 2008, by  Karl Storchmann (Journal of Wine Economics)


The impact of weather on wine quality has been well documented for thousands of years. However, not until recently have economists approached this phenomenon quantitatively. As documented by Orley Ashenfelter (see our article about Judging Bordeaux Vintages: Intuition and Super Crunching), warm and dry weather in the Bordeaux region can produce a wine that is substantially more expensive than a wine from a wet and cold vintage. In regions that are already at the temperature optimum the relationship may be the other way 'round.

At least on paper, the step from weather to climate is a small one. For the last 6-8 years, there has been is a growing body of literature on the relationship between viticulture and global warming. Some of these papers assess the economic impact on wine and vineyard prices. (see, for instance, "Go North Young Grapes" in SLATE) others evaluate the impact of global warming on wine quality (e.g., this article in the journal 'Climatic Change').

 

Last year, Greg Jones, a climatologist at Southern Oregon University, and collaborators published a widely noticed paper in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science PNAS (click here for the paper). They predict that increases in the frequency of extreme hot days (>35°C) during the growing season will eliminate winegrape production in many areas of the United States, including parts of the Napa Valley. Grape and wine production will likely be restricted to a narrow West Coast region and the Northwest and Northeast, areas currently facing challenges related to excess moisture.

 

At the Annual Conference of the America Association of Wine Economists in Portland (Aug 14-16) Greg Jones (together with Gregory Goodrich of Western Kentucky University) will present a paper that evaluates the causes of longer growing seasons, less year-to-year variability and fewer frost days on the U.S. West Coast. Is really global warming the sole driving force or are these effects caused by periodical phenomena such as El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO)?

 

The result: The currently experienced longer growing seasons and small year-to-year variability is the result of a combined effect of both a general temperature increases and periodical effects. When the PDO returns to a multi-decadal cold phase, wine growers across the western USA will likely experience greater variability in wine quality.

 

Here is their abstract:

Trends in climate variables important to winegrape production in the western United States include fewer frost days, longer growing seasons, and higher spring and growing season temperatures. These trends have been related to a steady increase in wine quality and a decrease in year-to-year variability. While the trends in climate have been linked to increasing sea surface temperatures in the eastern Pacific, it is unknown whether this is caused by climate change or may be part of natural oscillations in the Pacific. In this study, 15 climate variables important to winegrape production were analyzed for 10 wine regions over the western USA. The variables were stratified by phases of the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO), both separately and then in combination (modulation effect) to determine if there are any significant differences between teleconnections. ‘Wine Spectator’ vintage ratings for Cabernet Sauvignon wines from the Napa Valley were also stratified by the same method, and multivariate statistics were used to determine which variables are most important to wine quality.

 

ENSO phase by itself was not found to be important to either climate variability in wine regions in the western USA or wine quality in Napa Valley, but the cold phase of the PDO was found to be associated with increased spring frosts and a shorter growing season that results in lower ratings relative to warm PDO. The combination of neutral ENSO conditions during the cold phase of the PDO was nearly always associated with low quality wine in the Napa Valley, which is a function of cold springs with increased frost risk, cool growing seasons, and ripening period rainfall (cold PDO), and above-average bloom and summer rainfall (neutral ENSO). Although climate trends toward generally warmer growing seasons with less frost risk have occurred, this research highlights the impact of climate variability on wine quality where, should the PDO return to a multi-decadal cold phase, wine growers in the Napa Valley and across the western USA will likely experience greater variability in wine quality.

 

Evidence of these conditions have occurred during the 2007-08 winter and into spring 2008 where a much colder and wetter than normal winter in the PNW and northern California has been seen. A lingering moderate to strong La Niña event in the tropical Pacific has been boosted by the influence of the larger cold phase of the PDO in the North Pacific. The result has been higher snow packs throughout most of Washington, Oregon, and northern California and anywhere from a one to four week delayed bud break or bloom (grapevines and orchard fruit, respectively) followed by an increased frequency of frost. During the third week of April 2008, some of coldest conditions since the mid 1970s caused widespread damage to everything from cherries, peaches, pears, apples, to winegrapes. As of April 24th winegrape growers in Sonoma and Napa had already estimated a 10-25% yield loss due to frost and are still waiting for spring to come.

Wine Economics Feature in "The Economic Journal"

June 30, 2008, by  Karl Storchmann (Journal of Wine Economics)


Wine economics increasingly establishes itself as a distinct economic discipline. Recently, "The Economic Journal" published a series of wine-related articles. Needless to say that all articles are by editors or board members of the "Journal of Wine Economics"





Richard Baldwin Professor of International Economics at the Graduate Institute in Geneva, CEPR Policy Director, and VoxEU.org Editor-in-Chief summarizes the articles as follows:

"Why do economists have to take the fun out of everything?

Wine lovers worldwide enjoy discussing the finer points of terroir; Saint-Estèphe is harder than Pauillac, as every connoisseur recognises. It’s the heavier, thicker soils, don’t you know?

All bunk, according to recent research by Olivier Gergaud and Victor Ginsburgh. Using a database on terroir characteristics such as land characteristics (exposures of vineyards) and techniques (grape varieties, picking method, bottling, etc.) in 100 vineyards combined with data on measures of quality (ratings and auction prices), they show that endowments don’t matter. It’s technology. The French marketing myth of terroir won’t die easily, but the smart money should ignore it.

Publishing in the same issue of The Economic Journal, the dean of terroir debunkers – Orley Ashenfelter – studies the prices of Bordeaux vintages. Older Bordeaux taste better so the same wine is sold twice; when it’s young en primeur and when it’s ready for decanting.

In a sober market, the wine’s en-primeur price should be an unbiased predictor of its ready-to-drink price. Not so. The quality and prices of vintage Bordeaux is predicted by the weather that created the grapes, but this easily measured determinant is ignored by purchasers at the en primeur auctions. Instead, the prices paid by early buyers are influenced by tasting results, especially the ratings of Robert Parker.

Smart money ignores Parker. Get a weather report for the vintage year and a copy of Ashenfelter’s ‘Predicting the Quality and Prices of Bordeaux Wine'.

Fine advice if you’re aiming for value-for-money in your cellar. Making money requires a different approach. Predicting a beauty contest winner is not, as Keynes famously opined, a matter of judging beauty but rather judging the judges judgment on beauty. When it comes to Bordeaux, the judge-in-chief is Robert Parker.

Michael Visser and colleagues estimated the Parker effect on en primeur prices using a clever quirk. For years, Parker has come to Bordeaux to taste and grade the wine when it is extremely young. Statistically, his grades have a huge impact on prices. But in 2003, it didn’t work. Fearing war in Iraq, Robert stayed home in the Spring of 2003 and his grades were published only after the determination of the en primeur prices. Using the 2002 and 2003 en primeur prices for approximately 250 wines from a large Bordeaux wine broker, they estimate the Parker effect. About 2.80 euros per bottle."


This article was published by VoxEU.org on June 28 at www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1274

Dollar Daze in the Wine Wall

June 25, 2008, by Michael Veseth (University of Puget Sound and The Wine Economist)


You know that wine economics has become mainstream when you find yourself listening to it on the car radio.

The Dollar and the Wine Wall

Marketplace, a program of American Public Media that is broadcast by many National Public Radio stations, recently featured a story called U.S. Winemakers Toast a Strong Euro. Go ahead and click on the link to listen to the story or read the transcript.

The basic idea, which my International Economics students will recognize immediately, is that exchange rate changes create many direct and indirect winners and losers. This is particularly true in the increasingly integrated global wine market. The Euro has appreciated from about USD 1.35 per Euro to about USD 1.55 in the last year, which means that a wholesale €10 bottle of French or Italian wine’s dollar cost has increased from $13.50 to $15.50. This pushes the retail price from about $20 to $23 or $24, assuming a full cost pass-through, which puts it at a different price point on the supermarket shelf. Higher shipping costs will nudge the dollar price a bit higher still. Basically, you’re looking at a $20 wine selling for as much as $25. U.S. wines are corresponding cheaper in Eurozone countries.

U.S. winemakers hope that the falling dollar will be their ticket to higher sales abroad. I wrote about this in January when a group of Washington and Oregon wineries organized an export event in London. It is difficult to get traction in foreign markets, but the dollar’s weakness should help.

In the meantime, rising import prices here give domestic wines an advantage. Wine buyers tend to make most of their purchases around particular “comfort zone” price points and rising import prices should create some advantageous substitution effects. This comes out in the Marketplace interview. One wine professional puts it this way

Say if they used to enjoy a Sancerre for $20 and now their favorite producer is $25, they’re going to look for a comparable producer in that same price range that they originally purchased.

And the idea is that the “comparable producer” might be from the U.S., although this isn’t always the case.

Now Things Get Complicated

A falling dollar encourages exports and discourages imports — so far we are following the textbook pretty closely. But real world economics, and wine economics in particular, is seldom so simple. Foreign wine producers and distributors obviously have an incentive to keep from losing their market and there are many strategies to soften the exchange rate effects. The New Zealand producers, for example, seem to have been pretty successful in finding new markets for their wine and strengthening their reputation in response to the rising New Zealand Dollar. So far NZ wine seem to be defying gravity — higher quantities and higher prices too. But not everyone can pull of this bit of magic (or necessarily do it forever in New Zealand’s case).

One way to retain market share is for European exporters, distributors and retailers to absorb some of the exchange rate effects themselves, limiting what economists call the “pass through effect.” Canadian wine columnist Anthony Gismondi wrote about this in April in the Vancouver Sun.

I think European winemakers will be under a lot of pressure this year as container shipping costs continue to rise and the Euro’s strength persist. Not all of these higher costs can or will be passed along immediately in the form of higher dollar prices. The biggest effects will probably be felt on low cost wine, where the shipping cost effect is proportionately greater and price sensitivity is higher, too. Look for foreign wineries to go upmarket if they can and to absorb costs or adjust in other ways if they can’t.

But high end wines are not immune from exchange rate problems. Decanter reported in March that the strong Euro was expected to depress prices for Bordeaux en primeur sales.

Winners & Losers

The dollar hasn’t fallen uniformly relative to all currencies. A dollar buys 3.1 Argentine pesos today, for example, which is about the same as a year ago (Argentina’s compounding economic problems have caused a run on the currency in recent days). The Chilean Peso has not appreciated as much as the Euro and the South African rand is actually cheaper in dollar terms than a year ago.

One well known Australian brand, Lindemans, has been sourcing wine from Chile and South Africa to keep costs down as the Australian dollar has risen — a controversial but not uncommon practice in today’s small world of wine. Look for the Lindemans “Country of Origin” wine series.

This suggests that the Dollar Daze on the Wine Wall might feature some interesting shifts, from France and Italy (and Australia and New Zealand) to Argentina, Chile and South Africa. Is it my imagination or are the wine critics and magazines already riding this wave by featuring these New World regions more prominently in their publications?

AAWE Papers in Portland: Wine Price and Subjective Appreciation

June 20, 2008, by Robin Goldstein (fearlesscritic.com) and Johan Almenberg (Stockholm School of Economics)


Suppose good X is similar to good Y, but has a considerably higher price tag. Most of us would probably expect good X to be slightly better than good Y along some dimension. Such an expectation would not imply that we would always purchase good X: the difference in how much we appreciate the two goods may be small, and not worth the increased expense. The point is simply that it seems reasonable to expect there to be some noticeable additional quality to the more expensive good.

 

In the forthcoming issue of the Journal of Wine Economics, we present our study “Do More Expensive Wines Taste Better? Evidence from a Large Sample of Blind Tastings” (joint work with A. Dreber, J. W. Emerson, A. Herschkowitsch, and J. Katz). Our main finding is that participants in blind tastings do not appreciate expensive wines more than cheap wines. In our sample of over 6,000 blind tasting observations, compiled by food and wine critic Robin Goldstein and discussed at length in his new book, The Wine Trials (Fearless Critic Media, 2008), we find that the correlation between price and overall rating is in fact small and negative, suggesting that individuals on average enjoy more expensive wines slightly less.

 
There is no reason to expect individuals with a great deal of experience of drinking wine to be similar to individuals with little experience in this regard. Using wine training (such as participation in a sommelier course) as a proxy for wine expertise, we were able to separate these “experts” from the rest of the tasters in the sample. We find indications of a small positive correlation for experts. This correlation is only marginally significant (the p-value is just below 0.10, despite the large sample size) and the coefficient is quite small, suggesting that even for expert tasters the correlation between price and subjective appreciation is less than overwhelming.

In both cases, the coefficients are of a moderate magnitude, but non-negligible, given that wine prices cover such a large range. Suppose that Wine X costs ten times more then Wine Y in dollar terms. In terms of a 100-point scale, such as that used by Wine Spectator, our estimates predict that non-experts will assign an overall rating that is four points lower for wine X, whereas experts will assign an overall rating that is seven points higher.

Why, then, do everyday wine drinkers spend money on expensive wines? The price tag itself may influence how much we appreciate the good. This is in line with a familiar finding in marketing research: increasing the price of a good sometimes increases the demand for the good for psychological reasons alone (see for example Cialdini, 1998), by signaling that the good is covetable. Goldstein explores this effect in The Wine Trials, which examines the methods of modern wine marketing, the undue deference of consumers toward numerical ratings in industry publications such as Wine Spectator, and the inconsistencies between controlled blind-tasting results and those sorts of ratings, which exhibit a strong positive correlation with price.

In a sense, our paper is a companion piece to Plassmann et al. (2008), in which experimental subjects reported higher levels of satisfaction from wine they were told was more expensive, even when it wasn’t; functional magnetic resonance imaging suggested that their brains responded differently to the taste experience itself. While Plassmann et al. seek to isolate the effect of contextual information (about price) on the experience of the wine, we seek to remove all contextual information (about price, producer, country of origin, varietal etc) and look at the subjective appreciation of the wine itself.

 
References:

Cialdini, R B (1998) Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. New York: Collins.

Goldstein, R. (2008). The Wine Trials. Austin: Fearless Critic Media.

Plassmann, H, J O’Doherty, B Shiv and A Rangel (2008). Marketing Actions Can Modulate Neural Representations of Experienced Pleasantness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105(3): 1050-1054.

Australian Winequake

June 16, 2008, by Michael Veseth (University of Puget Sound and The Wine Economist)

Market tremors seem to be felt everywhere — food, fuel, money, natural resources. And now in the wine world.

Wine Tremors

It has been hard to ignore the feeling of instability in the wine world for the last few months. There has been a lot of shifting around of brands and alliances, as if the big wine producers are feeling off balance and need to get recentered. In January, for example, Constellation Brands, the world’s largest wine company, sold off their high volume Almeden and Inglenook brands along with the Paul Masson winery to The Wine Group. The reported logic was that Constellation wanted to focus more on premium and superpremium wines. The Wine Group is a privately held San Francisco-based company that has its roots in Coca Cola’s old wine division. (See Note below.)  It makes and markets a variety of high volume brands, including Franzia, Concannon, Corbett Canyon, Glen Ellen, Mogen David and several international brands.. It is the third largest wine company in the United States, behind on Gallo and Constellation, with 44 million case sales in 2007.

I felt another tremor on Tuesday, when a Decanter.com story reported that Constellation had sold more of its wine brands, this time to a new Healdsburg, California-based group called Ascentia Wine Estates. The wineries are Geyser Peak Winery in Alexander Valley, Atlas Peak in Napa, Sonoma Valley’s Buena Vista Carneros, Gary Farrell Winery, Washington’s Columbia Winery and Covey Run, and Idaho’s Ste Chapelle. They produce about a million cases of wine a year between them. Vineyards in Napa and Sonoma county were included in the $209 million deal. The logic, the article said, was to allow Constellation to continue to sharpen its focus on key upmarket brands.

There are several interesting things about this sale. From the Constellation standpoint brands like Geyser Peak, Buena Vista Carneros and Columbia are a good deal more upscale than high-volume Almaden and Inglenook brands that were sold in January. Constellation sold 59 million cases of wine in the U.S. alone in 2007, so the loss of a million case capacity is less important, I think, than the sign that the company is very serious about reshaping itself to adapt to changing market conditions. Constellation says that they are going to focus on fewer brands at the top of the pyramid and I guess they really mean it.

Ascentia is clearly making a different bet. Ascentia is a private group that includes major investors GESD Capital Partners, a San Francisco-based private equity fund, wine distributor WJ Deutsch & Sons and Jim DeBonis, former chief operating officer of Beam Wine Estates (several of the brands included in this deal were part of the Beam Wine Estates portfolio when Constellation acquired that operation last year).

The involvement of the Deutsch family is significant. Deutsch is the masters of marketing and distribution of value-priced wines. They partnered with Australia’s Casella family to create [Yellow Tail], the best selling import wine in the U.S. (I have written about this in my [Yellow Tail] Tales article. They also import and distribute George DeBoeuf, J. Vidal Fluery and other important wine brands. They clearly see opportunity where Constellation does not. It will be interesting to see how this group adapts to the shifting wine landscape. I cannot believe that they are through assembling their new portfolio because I think there may be more wine brands on the market soon (see below).

Winequake

The news from California on Tuesday regarding the Constellation-Ascentia deal was interesting. But the news from Australia in yesterday’s Financial Times as stunning and represents the first of what might prove to be a series of significant winequakes.

Foster’s, the big Australian drinks group, announced major write-downs of its wine assets and the resignation of its CEO, Trevor O’Hoy. The FT’s Lex column summarized the situation like this:

We all know the feeling: a night of bacchanalian excess followed by regrets and a light wallet the next morning. Foster’s, after a 12-year bender in which it spent A$8bn in the wineries of Australia and the US, has a severe hangover. Australia’s biggest beer and winemaker on Tuesday announced A$1.2bn of write-offs, lowered profit forecasts and parted company with its chief executive.

Foster’s last big splurge, the A$3.7bn purchase of Southcorp, is partly responsible. Foster’s bought the Australian winemaker in 2005 for a generous 14 times enterprise value to forward earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization, among the highest multiples for deals in the wine sector at the time. It even mocked Southcorp, as it attempted to defend itself against the hostile takeover, for being unduly conservative with respect to its own earnings forecasts.

Fast-forward three years and the hubris has been punished. Integration was botched, partly due to the ill-judged decision to blend sales forces into a single unit in Australia. In the US, distribution was poorly managed. External factors packed the final punch. Australia’s vineyards produced a glut of wine and prices plummeted. The Aussie dollar surged, from about 76 US cents at the time of the acquisition to 95 cents today. Foster’s reckons that every cent move lops A$3.2m off the wine business’ earnings before interest and tax - forecast to total A$1.2bn this year.

Fosters owns 22 wineries in five countries and 60 wine brands, including Beringer, Lindemans, Wolf Blass, Penfolds, Rosemount and Matua Valley. Among other things it is writing off A$ 70 million of bulk wine inventory. It will try to trim its US inventory by 1.4 million cases. (Fosters was the fifth largest wine seller in the U.S. in 2007 with 20 million cases, about the same as Bronco wines and its Two Buck Chuck brand). This is more than a tremor. What does it mean? It is a Foster’s problem, or does it have larger significance?

The assumption for the last few years has been that bigger is better in the global wine market and that big global firms like Constellation and Foster’s had an unbeatable advantage. Is this just a shakeout, or are these recent events a signal that the world of wine is experiencing a fundamental change? Watch this space for updates.

Note: Coke purchased Franzia some years ago and built its wine division from that foundation. The Franzia family now owns Bronco Wines, the Two Buck Chuck company.

The Welfare Gains of Wine Market Globalization

June 12, 2008, by Omer Gokcecus, Seton Hall University (gokcekom@shu.edu)

Increasingly wines arrive in the American wine market from all over the world. Accomplishments such as being on the Wine Spectator’s yearly best 100 wines for vintages from places such as Argentina or South Africa would not have been possible fifteen years ago.  Yet the market continues to expand with wine produced in more and more countries around the world.  The American wine market is one of the most open in the world. The result is that the American wine drinker has increasingly diverse options in their wine choice.  Yet, with all this diversity, is the American consumer benefiting through cheaper and better quality wines? 

To answer this question, my graduate student, Andrew Fargnoli and I wrote an article in the Journal of Wine Economics, (December 2007: 2(2), pp. 187-195), “Is Globalization Good for Wine Drinkers in the United States?” where we analyzed changes in price, quality, and variety of wines available to consumers since 1988. We focused on these three dimensions because it is sensible to think that wine drinkers will be better off with lower prices, higher quality, and greater variety.

To determine the nature of the changes in wine price, quality and variety, we examined the Wine Spectator’s Top 100 list which has been published every year since 1988.  If average American wine drinkers were each year to go out and buy the top 100 wines, would they pay less money, have better quality and more variety in national origin in 2005 than in 1988?  Each year the Wine Spectator uses the same four factors to determine the list. They are taste, availability, price, and the x-factor, which takes into account how significant the wine’s achievement for that year has been.  These factors exclude the very expensive, the very rare and boutique wines and allows our study to concentrate on the so-called “average” American wine drinker. 

Our findings show that globalization has benefited the American wine drinker. We find that there is an overall decrease in the real price of a shopping cart of all 100 wines from year to year. For instance, the real price (in 1988 prices) for the basket of the entire Top 100 list was $4,313 in 1988; $3,132 in 1993; $2,533 in 1999; and $2,421 in 2004.  That is nearly a 44% decrease in prices from 1988 to 2004.  At the same time, there was no significant change in the quality of the wines on the Top 100 list. From 1988 to 2005, average score did fluctuate within a range of 1.66 points—the difference between highest average score 93.61 (in 1988) and the lowest average score 91.95 (in 1996).  But as a whole these fluctuations in quality can be tacked up to chance and are not significant.

In terms of variety, the number of countries appearing on the Top 100 lists over the 18 years represented in this study increases, from six countries in 1988 to a total of eleven countries in 2005.  In 1988, only six countries—namely France, Italy, Spain, U.S., New Zealand, and Lebanon (the latter two each with only one wine)—are represented. In 2005, the number of countries nearly doubles to eleven.

Our econometric analyses show that the decreasing wine price over the past 17 years can be explained by the loss of shares of the Old World countries: Replacing a French wine with a U.S. wine lowers the average real price by 1.0%; an Australian wine by 1.1%; and a wine from non-incumbent countries by 1.5%. To put it differently, replacing an Old World wine (French, Italian, etc.) with a New World  wine (US, Australia etc.) lowers the average real price by 1%.  Replacing an Old World wine with a New-New World wine (Chile, South Africa etc.) lowers the average real price by 2.5%. The increased presence of newcomers puts significant downward pressure on prices.

Thanks to globalization, the world of wine is filled with greater variety, the same level of quality and, at least for the wine drinker in the United States, it is also a more affordable one.

This Table provides you with a data summary of the paper!

[This article was published in the June 2008 Issue of Wine Business Monthly]

AAWE Papers in Portland: Price Premium for Organic Wines?

June 10, 2008, by  Karl Storchmann (Journal of Wine Economics)


For many reasons economists are intrigued by organic and biodynamic wines.  One of the many interesting questions is: Do organic wines command a price premium? And if yes, how high is it?

In general, producing organic produce is significantly more expensive than producing regular produce. Assuming the same crop yields per acre the per ton production cost of organic almonds is about 18% higher than for conventional ones. For broccoli this is about 15%. The cost studies of UC Davis are an excellent source for any kind of crop including grapes. http://coststudies.ucdavis.edu

Below I copied the 2004 cost tables for organic and conventional Chardonnay grapes grown in Sonoma county. (Both Chardonnay reports and many other reports can be downloaded from coststudies.ucdavis.edu)

Assuming a crop yield of 5 tons per acre, conventional grapes cost approximately $2,477 per ton. For the same specific yield, organic grapes cost $2,791 – a difference of almost 13%. However, assuming that per acre yields of organic fruit are normally lower this difference is likely to be much higher. If the organic vineyard yields only 3 tons per acre the cost will shoot above $4500 per ton, i.e., about 80% higher than for conventional grapes.

Conventional Chardonnay (Sonoma County, 2004)

Organic Chardonnay (Sonoma County, 2004)



As a result, organic winegrape growers need to command significantly higher prices to break even. This can easily be seen from the tables that report the respective net returns dependent on prices and crop yields. Even if the organic winegrape grower had the same yield per acre as his conventional counterpart (which he probably does not) he needs a substantial premium to survive.

Conventional Chardonnay (Sonoma County, 2004)


Organic Chardonnay (Sonoma County, 2004)

What does all that mean for organic wine?  The logical consequence must be: organic wine should be substantially more expensive than conventional wine.

 
Magali Delmas of UCLA’s Institute of the Environment and Laura Grant of UC Santa Barbara assessed the “price premium” for organic wines in the U.S. We published a first version of their research as an AAWE Working paper (AAWE Working Paper No. 13) which is downloadable from our website.

Their main finding is a “price paradox for organic wines.” Most wine makers distinguish between certifying their wine as organic and putting it on the label. While the organic certification raises the price by about 13% (probably driven by better quality) putting the eco-label on the bottle will more than offset the price gain and lead to a net loss.

Both will present their research at the AAWE Meetings in Portland (Magali Delmas will also talk about biodynamic wines, but that is a different story).

Here is their abstract:

Eco-labeling signals that a product has been eco-certified. While there is increasing use of eco-labeling practices, there is still little understanding of the conditions under which eco-labels can command price premiums. In this paper, we argue that the certification of environmental practices by a third party should be analyzed as a strategy distinct from although related to the advertisement of the eco-certification through a label posted on the product. By assessing eco-labeling and eco-certification strategies separately, we are able to identify benefits associated with the certification process independently from those associated with the actual label. More specifically, we argue in the context of the wine industry that eco-certification can provide benefits, such as improved reputation in the industry or increased product quality, which can lead to a price premium without the need to use the eco-label. We estimate this price premium of wine due to the eco-certification of grapes using 13,400 observations of wine price, quality rating, varietals, vintage, and number of bottles produced, for the period 1998-2005. Overall, certifying wine increases the price by 13%, yet including an eco-label reduces the price by 20%. This result confirms the negative connotation associated by consumers with organic wine. The price premium of this luxury good due to certification acts independently from its label, a confounding result not previously demonstrated by related literature.

New World meets the Old in Argentina

June 4, 2008, by Michael Veseth (University of Puget Sound and The Wine Economist)

The latest news from Argentina is good — exports are up 40%, according to a report on Decanter.com. A New World wine success story! Or is it?

Old World versus New World

Everyone who writes about wine ends up talking about Old World versus New World wines at some point. It is convenient shorthand, I guess. The OId World usually refers to the European heartlands of wine, France, Italy, Spain. The New World is pretty much everyplace else, but especially the US, South Africa, Australian and New Zealand, Argentina and Chile.

Simple dichotomies are often problematic and I think Old World versus New World raises some issues. Old World is often code for tradition, terroir and sophisticated taste while simple industrial wines are associated with New World producers. But it is easy to find counterexamples on each side of the divide. It’s hard to think of Beaujolais Nouveau as embodying the three Ts of Old World orthodoxy — Nouveau seems like the classic Chateau Cash Flow McWine. There are many New World producers, on the other hand, who seem to take the traditions of wine very seriously. John Williams at Frog’s Leap comes to mind. So sometimes it is difficult to know where Old World ends and the New one begins

This is particularly true of Argentina. Winegrapes came to Argentina in 1541, a couple of hundred years before vines showed up in Australia and New Zealand. We tend to think of Argentina as a New World producer because it seems like its wines have only appeared on world markets in the last ten years or so. In fact, however, if you look back a few years you find a much different narrative– a classic Old World wine story.

Old World Argentina

Argentina was settled by migrants from the Old World wine countries, especially Spain and Italy, so it is not unexpected that wine has long been part of its culture. But it might surprise you to know how much Argentina reveals its Old World roots. Argentine wine consumption has until quite recently been very high — Old World high. Looking back to the early 1960s, for example, the heaviest wine consumers in the world were the French (122 liters per person per year), Italy (107), Portugal (100) and then Argentina (83). Spain (61 liters per capita) and Chile came next. No other country came even close.

Argentine wine production was necessarily quite high, too. While France and Italy dominated global wine output in the 1960s, producing almost half of all wine between them, Spain (10%) and Argentina (7.5%) came next (followed by the North African countries that exported mainly to France). Argentina was the Australia of the 1960s.

But with one big difference. Australia (and to a lesser extent Chile) are significant wine nations today because of their high export volumes. Argentina, however, has always produced mainly for domestic consumers (it was actually a net importer of wine in the 1960s as near as I can tell). So it is Old World in terms of wine production and consumption, and has only recently become New World in terms of its global export market presence.

Argentina shares two other important wine attributes with its European relations, both of which are related to wine crises. Argentina’s first crisis, from which it is still emerging, was caused by protectionism. Starting in the 1930s, Argentine winemakers sought and received protection from foreign competition and then subsidies to support domestic production. Arthur Morris of the University of Glasgow wrote a good article on this a few years ago in the Journal of Wine Research. Winegrowing in the subsidized, protected market focused on quantity rather than quality and bad but very cheap wine was the result. There was no incentive to favor quality in the vineyard because good grapes and bad grapes were all mixed together in the cheap bulk wines that urban workers gulped down. Argentina made a lot of wine, but didn’t export any. Who would buy it? This produced, predictably, a crisis of over production.

Don’t Cry: Market Reforms

The big change occurred, according to Professor Morris, when Argentina’s economic policies changed course in the 1990s. The subsidies dried up and decent wines began to trickle in from abroad, establishing a higher standard. The game was up for inferior domestic brands. Competition changed the wine market dynamic, shifting it from quantity to quality. It took only a few years for higher quality Argentine wines to reach the world market, where you see them today. That’s when Argentina became a “New World” producer.

The market reforms that the Argentine industry implemented in the 1990s remind me of the EU agricultural market reforms that Old World wine producers will experience in the next few years. The Argentine reforms seem to have worked, which may be a good omen for the Old World producers, but the industry had to live through a deep crisis first.

It is a good thing that Argentina has made the shift to a wine exporter because of the second crisis it shares with the Old World: collapsing domestic demand. Wine consumption has fallen by about half in France since the 1960s, for example, as consumers have shifted from wine to beer, spirits, sodas and now water. Wine demand declined proportionately more in Argentina, from 83 liters per capita in the 1960s to only less than 30 liters today. The Decanter.com article reports that this trend continues.  Argentina has dodged this bad news bullet to a certain extent, however, because of its new focus on quality-driven export markets.

The map of world wine consumption is changing fast. You could define the Old World as the part of the map where high consumption rates have collapsed– France, Italy and Argentina are all there. The New World is where wine cultures are actually growing. Wine market reforms, like those that Argentina has taken and the EU now plans, seem necessary to rebalance the map and align global demand and supply.

Older, Newer: The Wine Lexicon Evolves

Pretty soon we are going to have to invent new terms to describe planet wine– Old World and New World have just about run their course. China and India are obviously not Old World wine countries (although China has made wine for nearly 2000 years) and not exactly New World, either. Perhaps, taking a cue from financial markets, which talk about emerging market economies, we will call them Emerging Wine countries.

And then there are countries like Georgia, Romania and Moldova that produce huge amounts of wine, some of which is now finding its way onto global markets. Old World or New? Old World, if you go by history. Georgia is where wine was first made, according to some historians. But the wine industries in these countries are still recovering (emerging) from the dark Soviet years, when quantity ruled and quality pretty much disappeared. Now, as their industries modernize, they are beginning to enter the market, too. So are they the Oldest World — or maybe the Newest one — and confronting the biggest challenges?